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Chapter pages in book: (p. 78 - 90)The period is of course too short to give much weight to these figures, but
they make sense in the light of recent developments. It is plausible that
the international position of the United States economy was in these years
too strong to permit foreign influences to play a significant role. In Britain
direct controls were designed to isolate the economy, but it is not clear
whether the greater role of counter-phases is due to these controls or per-
haps to the devaluation of sterling, which brought a counter-expansion
like that of 1931.
Conclusion. Our two-way classification of periods by national business
cycles and by movements of world trade has proved a simple and useful
tool for the analysis of foreign trade. We regard our world import cycles
as highly tentative and hope that they will gradually be improved, but
they enabled us to discover regularities of trade fluctuations that remained
hidden as long as the framework of national business cycles alone was
used. We have not tried to apply our method to activities other than
foreign trade, but it is not unlikely that the method of subdividing busi-
ness cycle phases would bring useful results in other fields.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary of Findings
Our analysis reveals, first, that the American and the British trade bal-
ances fluctuated cyclically over the last seventy-odd years. They have not
shown the irregular behavior one might expect of series which measure
differences between two largely independent economic activities. The
balances also have not merely oscillated around their trends as they might
if an adjustment mechanism worked instantaneously. Instead, the bal-
ances of both countries typically rose over extended periods of time; then
reversed themselves and similarly declined.
Second, these cyclical swings of the trade balances were related to the
tides of business in the two countries. Of thirty-nine comparisons between
balance changes during business contractions and during the preceding
and following expansions, thirty-four show conformity to business cycles.
The closeness of this relationship is remarkable in view of the fact that
we deal with the difjerence between exports and imports, and that foreign
trade must be strongly affected by forces outside the American or British
economies.
Though always close, the relations of the two trade balances to business
cycles were not all of the same kind. The American balance shows inverse
conformity; it rose more (or declined less) when American business con-
78Table 21 United States and Great Britain, 1881-1 939
CONFORMITY OF TRADE BALANCE CHANGES TO DOMESTIC BUSINESS
CYCLES (INDEx)
United States Great Britain
1881-1938 1883-1913 1920-1 938
Whole Domestic Expansion —43 +20 —100
Whole Domestic Contraction —54 +60 —100
Whole Domestic Business Cycle —68 +78 —100




Conformity indexes are constructed by rating a rise during business expansion or
fall during contraction plus 100, the opposite change minus 100, and averaging the
ratings for all phases covered, see text.
Co-phases: Periods when world cycle and domestic business cycle move in same
direction.
Counter-phases: Periods when world cycle and domestic business cycle move in
opposite direction.
Data are seasonally adjusted and based on dollars and pounds of 1930 parity.
aSmoothed by three-quarter moving averages with double weight for center quarter.
Source: This Table is a summary of Tables 2, 3, 11 and 14.
tracted than when it expanded in twelve of fourteen cycles, 1879 to 1938,
and again 1949 to 1956 (Table 21 ).' High positive conformity to British
business cycles, on the contrary, characterized the British balance in the
thirty-three years before World War I. In each of the five business expan-
sions of this period it rose more (or fell less) than in succeeding contrac-.
tions. In the interwar period, however, and as far as we can tell after
World War II, the reverse was true: the British balance moved opposite
to British cycles like the American. The index of conformity in this case
is —100.
The same relations are reflected in the rates of change of the balances
in business expansions and contractions (Table 22). The quarterly Ameri-
can balance, 1881-1938, fell on the average by $5.6 million per quarter
1Since this was written some very exceptional balance changes occurred in 1957
and 1958: a spectacular rise during the later part of the business expansion and an
equally large fall in the 1957-58 recession. There is little doubt that special circum-
stances, connected with the Suez crisis, were in large part responsible for this devel-
opment. Whether it also indicates some shift in the cyclical behavior of the American
trade balance remains to be seen, but all things considered, this seems rather
unlikely.
79during business expansion and rose by $6.7 million in contraction. The
quarterly British balance, 1883-1913, rose on the contrary by £200,000
in quarters of British business expansion and fell by £300,000 in those
of contraction. From 1920 to 1938, however, the British pattern is
reversed and a decline of £1.7 million in expansion contrasts with a rise
of £3.3 million in contraction (in pounds of 1930 parity).
Table 22 United States and Great Britain, 1881-1938
TRADE BALANCE: CHANGE DURING CYCLES IN WORLD TRADE AND
DOMESTIC BUSINESS
WEIGHTED AVERAGE CHANGE PER QUARTER
(in millions of dollars or pounds 011930 parity)
United States Great Britain
1881-1 938 1883-1 913 1 920-1938
Whole Expansion —5.6 +0.2 —1.7
Whole Contraction +6.7 —0.3 +3.3
Co-Expansion —3.3 +0.2 —2.3
Co-Contraction +0.2 +0.2 +3.8
Counter-Expansion —15.6 — +0.6
Counter-Contraction + 12.5 —1.3 +2.3
Co-phases: Periods when world cycle and domestic business cycle move in same
direction.
Counter-phases: Periods when world cycle and domestic business cycle move in
opposite direction.
Smoothed by three-quarter moving averages with double weight for center quarter.
Differences between these figures and those in Tables 2 and 11 are due to smoothing,
and to differences in periods covered.
Source: This table is a summary of Tables 2, 3, 11, 14.
These basic facts indicate the great sensitivity of trade balances to
domestic business fluctuations. They reveal also that —incontrast to a
common belief —thereis no common cyclical pattern for trade balances
of all industrial countries or of all creditor countries. Britain belonged to
both classes in both periods, yet the pattern of the balance reversed itself.
Ournextfinding is the contrast betweeki balance movements in differ-
ent stages of a given business cycle phase. In the later stages of business
expansions and at the beginning of contractions, balance changes were
much more closely related to business cycles than at other times. The
above-mentioned high conformity of the trade balances is largely due to
their systematic behavior in the neighborhood of business cycle peaks,
80which must be kept in mind in interpreting this conformity. It is certainly
striking that the American balance turned upward at eleven of fourteen
business peaks while the British balance, on the contrary, turned down-
ward at all five peaks before World War I.
Evidently, foreign trade was more regularly affected by the general
economic situation when prosperity reached its end and turned into reces-
sion than at other times; this was true whether the balance pattern was
positive or inverse.2 This implies that an American business peak meant
immediate deterioration in the trade balances of the world outside the
United States, while a British peak before 1913 meant immediate improve-
ment in such balances.
Inclusion of world cycles in the analysis throws further light on balance
fluctuations. Some surprisingly systematic features of balance behavior
emerge. Thus, when world and domestic cycles moved in opposite direc-
tions (counter-phases), conformity of both balances to domestic cycles
was always high (Table 21). In the case of the American balance this
regularity was of an expected nature, in the case of the British unexpected,
assuming that we expect imports to move with domestic business cycles.
The American balance fell each time a world contraction coincided
with American expansion (counter-expansions), but it fell in only seven
of sixteen cases when world expansion coincided with domestic expansion.
Correspondingly, the balance rose in eleven of thirteen counter-contrac-
tions, while in co-contractions rises and declines were of equal frequency.
This kind of contrast between co- and counter-phases was to be expected,
but the reliability with which the trade balance reflected each disagree-
ment between American and foreign business trends is still of interest. In
the decade after World War II there were two counter-expansions and
one counter-contraction. Again the balance showed large declines in the
former, a large rise in the latter.
The combined impact of world and domestic business cycles is well
brought out by the rates of change of the American balance in the com-
bined phases (Table 22). There is relatively little difference in the aver-
age balance change as between co-expansions and co-contractions. Thus,
if American business cycles had always moved with those abroad, no
balance pattern would exist. But large and opposite balance movements
are characteristic of counter-phases: an average quarterly increase of
$13 million in counter-contractions against a decline of $16 million in
counter-expansions.
20. Morgenstern's observation about American, British, French, and German
money markets is of interest here: ".. themonetary economies are much closer
to each other in times of stress and even crisis than in times of low activity or when
markets are at ease (which is usually, but not necessarily, the same thing) ."Op.cit.,
p.506.
81The results for Britain, 1883-1913, are similar in regard to co-phases.
Here too, conformity is low and the rate of change the same in co-expan-
sions and co-contractions. The role of counter-phases, however, is differ-
ent. Counter-expansions occurred only under exceptional circumstances,
i.e. after the devaluation of the pound. As a rule the British economy
experienced no cyclical expansion in the face of world contraction. Thus
the typical behavior of the balance in British business expansions is not
affected by world contractions.
Counter-contractions, on the contrary, were frequent if brief and were
characterized, as in the United States, by a high degree of balance con-
formity. However, while the American balance conformed inversely to
American cycles in counter-contractions, the British balance, 1883-1913,
conformed positively. In the United States, as one would expect, exports
were stimulated by the growing world demand, imports repressed by
domestic recession. In Britain, however, exports fell and imports increased.
This perverse behavior is the more noteworthy since the British balance
improved in half of the co-contractions before 1913.
In the interwar period, counter-contractions were also less favorable
for the British balance than co-contractions. Though the balance in this
period rose in all contractions, the rise in counter-contractions was about
half as large as that in co-contractions. In co-phases the British balance
showed perfect inverse conformity in the interwar period.
Exceptions to the various rules just mentioned occurred mostly in the
1930's. Thus the decline of the American balance in the co-contraction
1929 to 1933 was unusual for this phase. In the following counter-expan-
sion imports failed to show the typical rise, and in the co-expansion 1935
to 1937 the balance, in sharp contrast to its typical behavior, continued
to rise until the business peak. These exceptional movements, of course,
greatly affect those views about the typical behavior of the American
balance which are based exclusively on the interwar period.
The most important exceptional feature of the British balance in the
1930's is the rise from 1931 to 1933. This was the first British counter-
expansion in the period covered by our analysis. The improvement of the
British balance in this period parallels the exceptional rise of the Ameri-
can balance in the counter-expansion 1933-1935.
After World War II and the following readjustment period, the United
States balance seemed until 1956 to be returning to pre-1930 patterns.
It fell in the counter-expansion 1952 to 1953, turned sharply upward at
the business downturn in that year, and rose through the counter-con-
traction of The steep increase in the balance in the later part of
3The behavior of theAmericanbalance in the readjustment period after World
War II was strikingly similar to that of post-World-War-I days.
82the co-expansion which ended in 1957, however, and the sharp fall in
the co-contraction 1957-58 are unusual, as noted above.
The cyclical movements of the British balance in the 1950's are also
similar to those of the interwar period. The balance rose in the single
brief co-contraction and in the single brief counter-contraction; it rose
in the counter-expansion of 1949, which was again associated with the
devaluation of the pound; it fell sharply in each of two co-expansions.
interpretation of Findings
Explanation of the cyclical behavior of the trade balances requires the
breakdown of export and import values into prices and quantities, and
the further breakdown of each of these by types of commodities. Such an
analysis must wait, as stated earlier, until the data are available. Here
we present only a few preliminary conclusions which seem warranted on
the basis of our present material.
•The simplest and most common assumption about the effect of busi-
ness cycles on foreign trade is that imports rise in business expansions
and fall in contractions. This implies that exports conform to business
cycles in foreign countries, and a large part of the cyclical fluctuations of
the American and British trade balances is consistent with this assump-
tion. The outstanding example is found in American counter-phases, when
the changes in the balance and its components agree almost perfectly
with this theory.
But there are other features of trade balance cycles which are not
explained by mere import conformity. This applies, for instance, to the
regular decline of the American balance in the later, as opposed to the
earlier parts of business expansions; and to the steep rise of the British
balance before British business peaks, 1883 to 1913.
For an understanding of these balance movements we have to look to
the effects of a country's business cycles on its exports. Business expan-
sions may interfere with exports as rising home demand reduces incen-
tives to push foreign sales, causes delays in deliveries, etc. Rising prices
also may deter foreign buyers. In contractions, on the contrary, falling
home demand may stimulate exports. Though such effects may take place
only at certain cycle stages and not at others, they explain some important
features of the balance patterns. Thus, if balance movements are tied not
only through imports but also through exports to domestic cycles, their
high conformity to the latter is more plausible. The regular decline of the
American balance in the later part of business expansions, for instance,
is partly explained by their unfavorable effect on exports.
On the other hand, the regular rise in the British balance in British
83expansions before World War I is due to the positive conformity of
British exports to British business cycles. In this case world demand must
have increased sufficiently at the end of British expansions, and/or it
must have been sufficiently inelastic in respect to price to bring about the
increase in the value of British exports which explains these balance rises.
Import conformity and the effect of business cycles on a country's
exports go a long way toward explaining trade balance cycles. However,
we have also found some regular responses of the balances to business
cycles which cannot be explained in this manner since they run counter
to the assumption of import conformity. Thus American imports rose
regularly prior to American business cycle troughs in the period before
World War I, and this accounts for the cases of balance decline in co-con-
tractions. Again the rise of British imports after business peaks, 1883 to
1913, explains the regular decline of the British balance in the first stage
of business contraction. Also, in counter-contractions of the same period,
British imports rose despite domestic contraction, British exports fell
despite world expansion, and the balance thus fell when it would be
expected to have its largest rise. That the British balance in the contrac-
tions of the interwar period improved more when world trade declined
than when world trade expanded is another case in point.
It is probable that at least some of these balance movements which run
counter to the assumption of import conformity are due to price fluctua-
tions. It may be hoped, therefore, that the planned analysis of prices will
illuminate them.
Effectsof TradeBalance Changes on Cycles in General Business
We have in this paper dealt with the impact of business cycles on trade
balances. What about the opposite relationship: the effects of balance
fluctuations on business cycles? A few concluding remarks on this large
topic may be in order.
We distinguish two ways in which foreign trade movements may influ-
ence the path of a country's economy: via production and via monetary
reserves.4 For the discussion of the first type of effects, i.e. direct and
multiplier effects on production, employment, and income, it is preferable
to decompose the balance into exports and imports, and into price and
quantity movements since a given balance movement may have different
effects of this kind depending on the components to which it is due. Dis-
cussion of this type of effect will therefore be deferred until exports and
imports have been analyzed.5
distinctionhas been clarified and stressed by Neisser and Modigliani, National
income and international Trade, University of Illinois Press, 1953, Ch. 6.
does not mean that certain conclusions cannot also be drawn directly from
the balance movements. See for instance T. Wilson, Fluctuations in Income and
84The monetary effects of trade fluctuations on business cycles are appro-
priately treated in connection with the trade balance. For the impact of
such fluctuations on monetary reserves and thereby more or less auto-
matically on economic policies, it is precisely the movement of the balance
which matters. For instance, a decline in the balance, whether due to
exports or imports, will ceteris paribus mean a drain on reserves. This
may induce the automatic or deliberate adoption of countervaffing mone-
tary policies, and thus limit expansion or contribute to contraction. Know-
ing in what direction the balance moved in the two countries in given
periods and business cycle stages, we can therefore tell whether it tended
to strengthen or to dampen the fluctuations in the British and American
economies.
Though we know the direction, we do not know the extent of these
balance effects on business cycles. The trade balance is of course only
one of many factors, international and domestic, which affect monetary
reserves; and such reserves in turn are only one of the factors determining
economic policies.6 The question how large or small an influence the trade
balance had on the business cycles of a given country at a given time is
thus more difficult to answer and, in many cases, highly controversial.
The question certainly goes far beyond the scope of this study and no
attempt will be made to answer it. The few comments about the probable
extent of trade balance effects made below in discussing our findings about
the direction of such effects rely upon prevailing views. Thus it is gener-
ally assumed that economic policy is more sensitive to changes in mone-
tary reserves when reserves are small than when they are large; when the
change is a decline than when it is a rise; when exchange rates are fixed
than when they are free; and when there are no direct trade controls than
with controls.7
Employment, London, 1942. Wilson holds, for example (p. 99), that the business
downturn of 1920 in the United States was mainly due to two factors: the reversal
of government policy and the fall in the trade balance. He also considers the unfavor-
able balances of 1933 to 1936 as a depressing factor, and believes that the balance
was one cause of the downturn in 1937.
It may also be noted that Neisser and Modigliani, op. cit., conclude from their
estimates that the production effects of balance changes in the interwar period were
very weak.
6Our knowledge about the relations among monetary reserves, money supply, and
business cycles will be greatly enlarged by the comprehensive investigation of the
money supply in which Milton Friedman and his associates are currently engaged
for the National Bureau of Economic Research.
TWe may note Neisser and Modigliani's conclusions about measuring effects of
trade balance changes on incomes. "The main reason why any attempt at utilizing
the 'inverse' system had to be discarded lies in the attendant statistical errors
For one chosen year, 1928, we computed the various members' incomes from the
actual trade balances in that year and the actual value of the other predetermined
85Influence of Changes in the United States Trade Balance on Business
Cycles. Ouranalysisreveals that any influence which fluctuations in the
United States trade balance had, via monetary policy, on the United States
economy was predominantly anticyclical. As the balance rose typically in
business contractions and fell in expansions, it worked for the loosening
of credit in the former and for tightening in the latter. Such influence was
not continuous throughout a cycle phase but was at times reversed by
contrary tendencies. However, in the last part of expansion the balances
tended regularly to contribute to monetary strains, and at the beginning
of business recession they tended regularly to ease the strains.
The direction of these trade balance effects remained the same from
1880 to 1955 but their magnitude has changed greatly. Since World
War II monetary reserves have been so large as to preclude any sensi-
tivity of the economy to their variations. In the interwar period American
monetary policy seems to have been affected by reserve movements only
in isolated instances and these (like the gold outflow of 1931) were due
to capital transactions, not to the trade balance. Before World War I,
however, the United States economy was not insensitive to changes in
reserves and thus may have been influenced by trade balance movements.
In view of the large balance improvements which preceded business
troughs and the steep falls before peaks it cannot be ruled out that the
trade balance contributed to turns in general business in this period. The
following remarks, therefore, refer to the years before World War I only.
In regard to business troughs, first, one factor which argues against the
stimulating effect of the balance is that its rise usually ended two or three
quarters before the upturn of the economy. But this is not conclusive,
since the influence of a balance rise via monetary policy must take time and
wifi not, once it occurs, be reversed immediately by reversal of the bal-
ance. On general grounds, however, it is less likely that a rise in reserves
contributed significantly to a business upturn than that a decline con-
tributed to a downturn, since a rise in reserves does not exercise the same
variables. ... Whenthese computed values were compared with the actual values
the outcome was found to be extremely unsatisfactory. The errors were very large,
and in one case —UnitedKingdom —thecomputed income was even negative. The
trouble is that exports and imports, and especially trade balances are small in com-
parison with the income magnitudes; hence a relatively small error in the export
functions or import functions may cause an enormous error in the incomes. This
line of approach had therefore to be given up." (Op. cit., p. 33.)
Nevertheless, Neisser and Modigliani do present some estimates of effects of
balance-induced policy changes on incomes and find them relatively large, much
larger at least than the multiplier effects of balance changes. They comment: "Cer-
tainly there is no originality in the proposition that it is the necessity of equilibrating
the balance of payments which is primarily responsible for th.e transmission of
income changes through the world economy." (Op. cit., p. 129.)
86pressure on monetary policy as a decline. Moreover, credit policy is sup-
posed to be more effective in terminating expansions than in lifting the
economy from depression.
At business peaks a significant role of the trade balance is much more
likely. The sharp balance declines which preceded eight of the ten pre-
World-War-I peaks brought the balance to exceptionally low levels; so it
may be that unusually low trade balances put a stop to business expan-
sions. This is especially likely from 1882 to 1895 when four out of five
consecutive business downturns came at about the same low point of the
balance —a$5 to $lO miffion quarterly deficit.
Against the assumption that the trade balance was a factor in business
peaks is the objection that there are some instances of sharp balance
declines which did not halt business expansions. In particular, four of the
five declines which characterized counter-expansions of this period were
not followed by domestic peaks; in these cases world upturns caused the
balance to recover before the domestic upswing was interrupted. But these
declines occurred at the beginning of expansions when the economy, for
understandable reasons, was not sensitive to balance changes.
One might think that depressing effects of the trade balance at Ameri-
can business peaks signified transmission of foreign depression to the
United States. But on the contrary, seven of the eight instances of balance
decline before the peak occurred in periods characterized by world expan-
sion. Thus the United States in this period is an example of the case where
a country's trade balance is a restraining force at the end of its business
expansions, not because of foreign depression but despite simultaneous
foreign expansion.
If it were true that the trade balance played a role in the termination
of United States expansions before World War I, then this would help
explain the instability of the American economy in that period. Such vague
current explanations as the "youth of the country" could be replaced by
specific factors such as the depressing effect of the later stages of United
States expansions on exports, the high income elasticity of imports, and
a monetary system which was sensitive at certain times to a foreign drain
on reserves. The "singularly different rhythm of the American cycles
(which) is a frequently mentioned phenomenon of considerable interest"8
and the tendency of United States business peaks to lead world peaks
(Table 19) would then be due in part to the impact of foreign trade
on the American economy. These leads of American reversals have been
deemed "to support the notion that the United States exported depres-
sion" before World War 1.° This notion would gain a somewhat different
80.Morgenstern,op. cit.
Morgenstern, op. Cit.
87meaning if the United States depression was itself in a certain sense
"imported."
Influence of Changes in the British Trade Balance on British Business
Cycles, 1883 to 1913. The irregular behavior of the British trade bal-
ance in some stages of British business cycles implies that any effects
of balance changes on business were in these stages sometimes pro- and
sometimes counter-cyclical. However, the high positive conformity of
the balance to British cycles shows that the former effects must have
predominated.
Particularly in the last stage of business upswings, the balance contrib-
uted to monetary expansion, and at the beginning of recessions, to con-
traction. Thus, in contrast to the United States, the monetary effects of
trade balance movements could not contribute to business downturns in
Britain. Rather, business upturns may have been made easier by the rising
balance which regularly preceded them by one year.
The predominantly cycle-reinforcing character of trade balance effects
on British cycles implies a stabilizing effect on the rest of the world when
world cycles moved with British cycles.'0 At the end of British expan-
sions, the British balance rise caused pressure on other countries' reserves;
after the British turn, it brought relief. This is the opposite, of course, of
the impact of the American balance on other countries and also of the
British balance in later years.
On the probable extent of the above-mentioned effects we can offer
only a few remarks. The amplitude of British balance movements was
relatively small. The cyclical change was on the average only 1.6 to 2.0
per cent of the value of foreign trade. However, relative to the scanty
reserves of the Bank of England, the balance movements were not neg-
ligible. From 1883 to 1894 the reserves of the Bank of England amounted
on the average to £24 million; from then to World War I, to about £36
million." The average quarterly variation of the reserve, including sea-
sonal movements, was about £2.2 million; this is less than half the corre-
sponding change in the trade balance, which was £4.8 million. Thus the
possibility of an effect is not ruled out by the relative magnitudes.'2
lOThjs is not in contradiction to a net destabilizing effect on the world inclusive of
Britain which may result when the effect on Britain is larger than that outside of
Britain. The relatively highly developed British credit structure may lead to such a
destabilizing world effect (see G. Haberler, Prosperity and Depression, Geneva,
1940, p. 422).
11Data from W. E. Beach, British International Gold Movements and Banking
Policy, 1881-1913, pp. 72-73.
'2The effect of the trade balance on reserves may have been reinforced by that of
the service balance, which seems also to have moved with British cycles (see Knapp,
op. cit., p. 2, note 2). Capital movements, however, may have been in the opposite
direction (see Lichtenberg, op. cit.). Nevertheless, it may be noted that according
88How sensitive British bank policy in that period was to variations in
reserves is a controversial question. R. S. Sayers has shown that the Bank
frequently resorted to measures designed to protect the British economy
from the influence of changes in the reserve, and that the effect of these
measures is reflected in the movements of the discount rate, which rose
typically in business expansions despite increasing reserves and which fell
correspondingly in contractions. The most important measure used by the
Bank for this purpose was variation of the purchase price of gold.'3 We
may add that the cycle-reinforcing character of the trade balance move-
ments may explain some of the Bank's reluctance to transmit their effects
to the economy.
But granting considerable weight to domestic factors does not require
negating all influence of foreign factors. Even if a more favorable balance
was associated with a rising bank rate, this rise may well have been smaller
than it would have been with a falling balance. In its attempts at counter-
cyclical policy the Bank may have been hampered considerably by the
movements of the balance.
Influence of Changes in the British Trade Balance on British Business
Cycles after World War I. In the interwar period the effects of the trade
balance on monetary reserves was counter-cyclical in Britain. A falling
balance preceded the cycle peaks in 1924, 1929, and 1937. The decline
was mild and relatively brief (one year) before 1929, large and protracted
(two or three years) before 1924 and 1937. Two of the three cycle
troughs were preceded by a sizable improvement in the trade balance.
There was a large rise for a year before the 1932 business upturn, and at
the 1928 trough the balance reached its highest point in four years. It is
possible that these movements damped British business cycles.
In the decade after World War II, the movements of the British balance
again were counter-cyclical and in this period there is no doubt about
their influence on British economic policy. When the balance and mone-
tary reserves decline, the government restricts credit and takes fiscal
measures to reduce investment and consumption. "In fact, a recurrent
conflict between the needs of internal capital development and external
trade balance has figured prominently in British experience during the
ten-year period since the war. ...Ata given level of productivity, a fully
to Beach the direction of gold flows does not indicate that effects of trade balance
changes on bank reserves were offset by capital flows. He finds that gold imports
conformed positively to British cycles. "In general gold imports became important
during the later stages of the periods of business expansions, and at the same time
the volume of currency in the hands of the public was increasing. In contractions
the flows were reversed." (W. E. Beach, op. cit., p. 77.)
13"The Bank in the Gold Market, 1890-1914," in Papers in English Monetary His-
tory, ed. by Ashton and Sayers, Oxford, 1953.
89employed economy has no possible way of closing a deficit in its foreign
balance unless it can cut down its absorption of resources for domestic
purposes —thatis, for consumption, investment, and government uses."14
The influence of the trade balance on a country's economy was the
starting point of economic theory and has remained a subject of great
concern. This paper has tried to make a modest contribution to the prob-
lem by clarifying the historical fluctuations of the United States and British
balances. We hope to learn more about the connections between business
cycles and foreign trade through the analysis of the components of the
balance: export and import quantities and prices.
14Ragnar Nurkse, "The Relation between Home Investment and the External Bal.
ance in the Light of British Experience, 1945-1955," The Review of Economics and
Statistics, May 1956, p. 121, p. 137.
90